Risk analysis should begin hours, days, or even weeks before a flight. For a simple flight, hours in advance may suffice. However, for a complex flight with multiple legs or a series of flights over several days, a pilot should begin to consider hazards and associated risks over an extended time period.

When assigning a risk level to a hazard using a matrix, the results could be subject to certain errors.

The matrix provides discrete results that depend on the accurate assignment of likelihood and severity. While conducting a risk assessment, a pilot may be unsure of the likelihood or severity for a particular risk or find it difficult to choose between adjacent parameters. In such cases, pilots should apply the more conservative parameter(s), which place the risk at a higher level. Pilots learning risk analysis should seek the opinion of a more experienced pilot or an instructor if there is any doubt as to the accuracy of inputs.

Pilots sometimes use inputs that skew the risk toward a lower level due to the desire to complete a flight.

The matrix results lose relevance if the hazards change before a flight departs. Pilots should verify and reevaluate their risk assessment based on current information and conditions before flight.

The pilot, Tricia, identified nine separate hazards and associated risks that will affect a direct non-stop flight from Animas Air Park (00C) in Colorado to the Santa Rosa, California airport (KSTS). Now, she begins the process of assessing these risks using PAVE checklist elements.

Tricia identified both capability and aeromedical risks. She concludes that reduced IFR proficiency means that a loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) event is possible although unlikely. A LOC-I event, especially in convection or icing conditions, could result in a fatal accident. A combination of “remote” likelihood and “catastrophic” severity indicates a serious (yellow) risk on the risk assessment matrix.

She also self-assessed her aeromedical risks using the IMSAFE checklist and identified alcohol and fatigue as potential hazards. The risks associated with these hazards could lead to multiple in-flight errors that could result in major damage or injury. Collectively, she assesses these risks as having “occasional” likelihood and “critical” severity. On the risk assessment matrix, this combination indicates a serious (yellow) risk. [Figure 4-2]

She identified three areas that pertain to aircraft-related risk. During a non-stop flight, the likelihood of fuel exhaustion increases if extensive deviation around weather is needed. Fuel exhaustion over rugged western terrain could result in a fatal accident. Her assessment results in a “remote” likelihood with “catastrophic” consequences, which indicate a serious (yellow) risk on the risk assessment matrix.

Tricia also noted that her aircraft is not approved for flight in known icing conditions and that a flight along the planned route might encounter icing conditions at some point. Even with an “occasional” likelihood, this could generate a CFIT or LOC-I event with fatalities, or “catastrophic” consequences, thus indicating a high (red) risk on the risk assessment matrix.